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Abstract
Financial  integration among economies has the benefit of improving allocation 
efficiency and diversifying risk. However the recent global financial crisis, considered as 
the worst since the Great Depression has re-ignited the fierce debate about the merits of 
financial globalization and its implications for growth especially in developing countries. 
This paper examines whether equity markets in emerging countries were vulnerable to 
contagion during the recent financial meltdown. Findings show: (1) with the exceptions of 
India  and  Dhaka,   Asian  markets  were  worst  hit;  (2)  but  for  Peru,  Venezuela  and 
Columbia,  Latin  American  countries  were  least  affected;  (3)  Africa  and  Middle  East 
emerging markets were averagely contaminated with the exceptions of Kenya, Namibia, 
Nigeria,   Morocco, Dubai,  Jordan, Israel,  Oman, Saudi  Arabia and Lebanon.  Results 
have two important policy implications. Firstly, we confirm that Latin America was most 
prepared to brace the financial  crisis,  implying their  fiscal and monetary policies are 
desirous  of  examination  and  imitation.  Secondly,  we  have  confirmed  that  strategic 
opening of the current and capital accounts based on empirical  evidence for a given 
region/country as practiced by India is a caution against global economic and financial 
shocks. 
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1. Introduction
During  the  last  decade  the  concern  about  regional  and  global  integration  of 
emerging equity markets has been largely debated. The recent global financial meltdown 
and  economic  downturn  has  left  many analysts  concerned  about  whether  emerging 
markets suffered from contagion. Most of these markets were still in their infancy at the 
turn of the millennium, which rendered an examination of the transmission of financial 
variable  movements  from  global  crisis  somewhat  impractical.  Therefore,  regrettably 
effects of the US stock market crash of 1987, the Mexican peso crisis of 1994, Asian 
currency crisis of 1997, Russian and LTCM1 crises of 1998, Brazilian crisis of 1999 and 
Turkish 2000/2001 crisis have not been fully assessed in all emerging equity markets. 
The recent financial crisis provides a golden opportunity for this investigation. 
There are plenty of reasons a paper should be dedicated to studying the extent 
to which emerging financial markets have been affected by the recent global financial 
turmoil.  Results  of  the  study  could  enable  analysts  and  policy  makers  to  evaluate 
benefits  of  international  trade  and  cross-border  investments,  and  therefore 
attractiveness for foreign capital inflows. Findings could also provide some basis on how 
developing countries stand to benefit (loss) from long-run investment sources and global 
financial  booms  (as  a  result  of  external  financial  shocks)  through  financial  market 
1 Long-term Capital Management. 
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integration. A natural extension of results could invite policy makers to reconsider Latin 
American monetary and fiscal strategies in the fight against external financial shocks. 
Also, the validity of India’s financial liberalization strategy could be of crucial importance 
to governments in other developing countries.2 Therefore this study aims to assess the 
impact of the recent global financial shock on emerging financial markets. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 thoroughly reviews related literature. Data and 
methodology   for  measuring  contagion  are  presented  and  outlined  respectively  in 
Section 3. Empirical analysis and discussion are covered in Section 4. We conclude with 
Section 5.  
2. Related literature
2.1 Effects of financial market integration
Financial integration between economies is believed to have two main positive 
impacts:  the  improvement  of  capital  allocation  efficiency  and  diversification  of  risks 
(Demyanyk and Volosovych,  2008; Coulibaly,  2009; Kose et al.,  2011). However, the 
recent global financial  crisis which is viewed by many analysts and policy makers as 
worst since the Great Depression has cast a dark shadow on the contagious effect of 
financial  integration;  despite  its  advantages.  There  is  an  extensive  economics  and 
finance literature that addresses the potential benefits of financial integration. 
From  a  theoretical  standpoint  financial  globalization  should  facilitate  efficient 
international allocation of capital  and improve international risks sharing (Kose et al., 
2011).  Kose  et  al.,(2011)  posit  that  the  benefits  are  much  greater  for  developing 
countries because they are relatively scare in capital and rich in labor sources. In effect, 
access  to  foreign  capital  should  help  them  grow  faster  through  new  sources  of 
investment.  They further  profess  that  since  developing  countries  have  more  volatile 
output growth than advanced industrial  economies,  their  potential  welfare gains from 
international  risk  sharing  are  much  greater.  Their  findings  reveal  that  with  certain 
identifiable thresholds in variables such as financial depth and institutional quality, the 
cost-benefit trade-off from financial openness improves significantly once the threshold 
conditions  are  met.  Much  earlier  Demyanyk  and  Volosovych(2008)  in  analyzing  the 
benefits  of  financial  integration  (resulting  from  international  risk  sharing)  among  25 
European Union(EU) countries, presented a case for diversification of risk across EU 
member states if the risks are fully shared. In a nutshell they stressed that the 10 new 
members joining the EU would have higher gains than the long standing 15 members. 
The most striking indication of financial integration benefits is the case of South Africa, a 
country that has experienced financial autarky as a result of the embargo imposed in 
1985 and removed in 1993. With respect to Coulibaly (2009), there was a significant 
decrease in the rates of investment, capital and output during the embargo period in 
South Africa as compared to pre-embargo and post-embargo periods.   
  During the embargo South Africa could benefit from financial isolation in event of 
a global financial meltdown. This implies countries in relative financial autarky as less 
2Whereas the Indian current account has been opened fully though gradually in the 1990s, a 
more  calibrated  approach  has  been  followed  in  the  opening  of  the  capital  account  and 
subsequently  the  financial  sector.  This  approach  is  consistent  with  the  weight  of  available 
empirical evidence on the benefits of capital account liberalization for acceleration of economic 
growth,  particularly  in  emerging  economies.  Evidence  suggests  that  the  greatest  gains  are 
obtained from openness to foreign direct investment followed by portfolio investment. Benefits  
resulting  from  external  debt  flows  are  questionable  until  greater  domestic  financial  market 
development has taken place (Henry, 2007). 
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exposed  to  international  financial  shocks.  Though  a  prime  advantage  of  financial 
integration  is  risk  diversification,  paradoxically  increased  financial  globalization  can 
reduce the scope for risk diversification because integrated markets tend to be more 
interdependent and highly correlated. Another disadvantage of financial integration could 
be linked  to  threshold  factors  pointed out  earlier  by  Kose et  al.  (2011).  Their  study 
reveals that countries with low levels of financial depth and institutional quality do not 
stand  to  benefit  from financial  integration.  This  perspective  is  shared  by  Schmukler 
(2004)  who  stresses  the  importance  of  sound  financial  fundamentals  and  strong 
macroeconomic  institutions,  the  presence  of  which  should  enable  more  effective 
management  of  crises  and  lower  the  probability  of  crises  and  contagion.  Therefore 
financial globalization could itself be a source of crises. 
2.2 Linkages between financial integration (globalization) and crises
We have seen that financial globalization has several potential benefits. However 
the recent stream of financial  crises and contagion owing to growing liberalization of 
financial systems and integration of financial markets around the world, might lead some 
to  suggest  that  globalization  breeds  financial  volatility  and  crises.  Though  domestic 
factors are mostly at the origin of crises, there are different channels via which financial  
globalization could be related to crises.
Firstly, as pointed out by Schmukler (2004) when a country’s financial system is 
liberalized,  it  becomes an object  of  market  discipline  exercised  by both foreign  and 
domestic investors. In a closed economy, only domestic investors monitor and react to 
unsound fundamentals, whereas in an open one domestic and foreign investors might 
prompt the country to achieve sound fundamentals. As elucidated earlier, the absence of 
sound  macroeconomic,  financial  and  institutional  fundamentals  could  increase  the 
probability of crises. It  logically follows that antagonistic interests and views between 
investors  (domestic  and  foreign)  on  key  fundamentals  might  precipitate  crises  and 
reduce the ability to effectively monitor and manage them.  
Secondly,  even  with  sound  domestic  fundamentals  and  quality  institutions, 
international  financial  market  imperfections  could  also  lead  to  crises.  Among  other 
things,  these could  lead to herding behavior,  irrational  behavior,  speculative  attacks, 
bubbles,  and  crashes.  To put  this  point  plainer,  regardless  of  market  fundamentals 
investors could speculate against a currency if they believe that the exchange rate is 
unsustainable; this could lead to self-fulfilling balance-of-payments. This thesis illustrated 
by Obstfeld (1986) has been purported by Schmukler (2004); amongst others. 
Thirdly,  even  in  the  presence  of  sound  fundamentals  and  absence  of 
imperfections in international capital markets, crises might still arise owing to external 
factors (Schmukler, 2004) such as determinants of capital flows (Calvo et al., 1996) and 
foreign  interest  rates  (Frankel  and  Rose,  1996).  For  instance  if  a  country  becomes 
dependent on foreign capital, shifts in foreign capital flows could create financial issues 
and economic downturns.  Frankel  and Rose (1996)  clearly  point-out  the role foreign 
interest  rates  play  in  determining  the  likelihood  of  financial  crises  in  developing 
countries.    
Fourthly, still borrowing from Schmukler (2004) financial globalization could lead 
to financial crises by contagion, namely by shocks through real links, financial links and 
herding-behavior or unexplained high correlations. We shall focus on this fourth example
3 within our research framework; the elucidation and definition of which are worthwhile.   
3 Example on the link between financial integration and crises. 
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2.3 Definitions and channels of contagion
2.3.1 Definitions of contagion
As yet, there is no established definition of contagion by economists. According 
to the World Bank, there are three main definitions of the phenomenon. Firstly, from a 
broad  perspective  contagion  could  be  identified  with  the  general  process  of  stock 
transmission  across  countries.  Therefore,  it  is  worthwhile  understanding  that  this 
definition  does  encompass  both  negative  shocks  and  positive  spillover  effects. 
Secondly,  contagion could  be conceived  as the propagation of  shocks between two 
countries  in  excess  of  what  should  be  expected,  based  on  the  fundamentals  after 
considering  co-movements  triggered  by  common  shocks.  This  second  definition  is 
somewhat restrictive only to shocks and presupposes the mastery of what constitutes 
the underlying fundamentals, without which an appraisal of excess co-movements is not 
possible.  The  last  and  more  restrictive  definition  considers  the  phenomenon  as  the 
change in the transmission mechanisms that take place during a period of turmoil and 
could be appreciated by a significant increase in cross-market correlations. Within the 
framework of this study, we shall be restricted to the third definition because: (1) our 
study aims to investigate the global financial crisis which is a negative shock and not a 
positive spill-over (as opposed to the first  definition);  and (2) we do not master what  
constitutes  underlying  fundamentals  of  co-movements  we  are  about  to  study  (in 
antagonism to the second definition). 
Empirically, the third definition was first proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002). 
They assessed  contagion  as  a  significant  increase  in  market  co-movements  after  a 
shock occurred in one country. With respect to this definition, the condition for contagion 
is a significant increase in co-movements as a result of a shock in one market. This 
implies, if two markets display a high degree of co-movements during the stability period, 
even if they are highly correlated during a crisis, if this crisis-correlation is not significant 
it does not amount to contagion. In the absence of a significant correlation during the 
crisis-period, the term ‘interdependence’ is used to qualify the situation between the two 
markets.  
2.3.2 Channels of contagion
Borrowing from Schmukler (2004), three mains channels of contagion have been 
identified in the literature. (1) Real links which are often associated with trade links. For 
example if two countries are trading together and compete in the same external market, 
a  devaluation  of  the  exchange  rate  of  one  country  deteriorates  the  other  country’s 
competitive advantage. In a bid to rebalance its external sectors, the loosing country 
would  want  to  devaluate  its  own  currency;  such  is  the  nature  of  Chino-American 
commercial  relations  today.  (2)  Financial  links  come  in  when  two  economies  are 
connected  through  the  international  financial  system.  For  instance,  let’s  consider 
leverage institutions facing margin calls. Should the value of the collateral fall as a result 
of  a  negative  shock  in  one  country,  in  a  bid  to  increase  their  initial  stock   these 
institutions will sell some of their holdings in countries not yet affected by the shock. This 
gives birth to a mechanism that ripples the shocks to other countries. (3) Finally, due to 
herding behaviors  or  panics  resulting from asymmetric  information,  financial  markets 
might transmit shocks across markets. We shall not elaborate on the mechanics of this 
third type because of obvious reasons (common sense).  
2.4 Measuring  contagion 
Many methods of measuring contagion have been proposed in the literature to 
appreciate the spreading of international shocks across countries. The most widely used 
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are cross-market correlation coefficients procedures (King and Wadhwani, 1990; Forbes 
and Rigobon, 2002; Collins and Biekpe, 2003; Lee et al.,2007; Asongu,2011ab), cross-
market  co-integration  vectors  changing  techniques  (Kanas,  1998),  volatility  analysis 
based on ARCH and GARCH models (King et al., 1994) and direct estimation of specific 
transmission mechanisms (Forbes,  2000).  With respect  to our restrictive definition  of 
contagion  we  shall  adopt  Forbes  and  Rigobon  (2002)  in  the  context  of  Collins  and 
Biekpe (2003)4. 
3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
The object of this study is to investigate correlations between the returns of the 
USA  stock  index  and  stock  indexes  of  emerging  countries.  Taking  the  Dow  Jones 
Industrial Average as the base criterion, we analyze if co-movements between the base 
criterion and afore mentioned financial markets were significantly strengthened during 
the recent global financial crisis. In et al. (2008), MacAndrews (2008), Taylor and William 
(2008) and more recently Ji and In (2010) all use the August 9 th  2007 date as the start 
of the financial crisis5.   The sample period is divided into two categories: a 14 month 
pre-crisis period also known as the tranquil or stable period and a 15 month crisis or 
turmoil period. In a bid to make our findings robust, the turmoil period is further divided 
into  three  sections6:  the  short-run  or  four  month  crisis-period  (August  09,  2007  to 
December 06, 2007); the medium-term or eight months crisis-period (August 09, 2007 to 
April  10,  2008)  and  the  long-term  or  15  months  crisis-period  (August  09,  2007  to 
November  13,  2008).  Weekly  data  used  in  the  study  is  obtained  from Bloomberg’s 
database. We use local currency index return because Forbes and Rigobon (2002) have 
shown that using dollar or local indices will produce similar outcomes.      
3.2 Methodology 
Contagion is defined by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) as a significant increase in 
market co-movements after a shock occurred in one country7. 
The correlation coefficient is defined as:  
yx
xy
σσ
σ
ρ =                                                                                                   (1)
4 The hypothesis testing in Collins and Biekpe(2003) is slightly different from that of Forbes and 
Rigobon(2002) in that, the test statistics to determine contagion is not calculated using estimated 
sample variances.  Their test statistics (Collins and Biekpe, 2003) uses exact student statistics 
based on actual sample correlation coefficients. Contagion is then measured by the significance 
of  increase in  adjusted correlation coefficients  during the crisis  period as compared with  the 
stable period. 
5 Date at which, BNP Paribas announced the closure of its funds that held US subprime debts. 
6 From empirical  literature,  the  tranquil  period  is  always  longer  than  the  turmoil  period.  For  
instance  it  is  longer  by  a  year,   ten  and  a  half  months  and   nine  months  in  Forbes  & 
Rigobon(2002), Collins & Biekpe(2003)  and Lee et al.(2007) respectively. 
7 With respect to this definition, the presence of high correlation between two markets during the 
stable  period  and  eventually  continuous  increase  in  the  high  degree  of  cross  market  co-
movements at the turmoil period does not amount to contagion. Therefore contagion according to  
this definition is the presence of significant increase in co-movements after a shock. On the other  
hand,  if  the  high  correlation  degree  is  not  significant,  the  term ‘interdependence’  is  used  to  
describe the event.
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where: ‘x’ is the base criterion while ‘y’ is an emerging equity market. 
Borrowing from Forbes and Rigobon (2002), the correlation coefficient is adjusted in the 
following manner:
])(1[1
*
2ρδ
ρρ
−+
=                                                                                  (2)
Where:
1−= l
xx
h
xx
σ
σδ
  which appreciates the change in high-period volatility against low-period volatility. The 
crisis-period  is  used  as  the high  volatility  period  and  the tranquil  period  as  the low 
volatility  period in  the calculation  of  this  correlation  coefficient  adjuster.  Contagion is 
subsequently measured as the significance of adjusted correlation coefficients in time- 
varying turmoil periods versus the stability period. 
In  empirical  literature,  Collins  and Biekpe (2003)  and Lee et  al.  (2007)  have 
applied  both  the  t-test  and  F-test  respectively  for  the  significance  of  difference  in 
correlations. When only one coefficient  is to be estimated, both tests have the same 
implications. Following the t-statistics, the significance of increase in correlations during 
the turmoil period (t) with respect to the stable(s) period is defined by:
2)(1
4)(
st
st
st
nnt
ρρ
ρρ
−−
−+
−=                      (3)
Where
)4,01.0( −+ st nn
t
with, nt (ns) indicating actual observed weeks during the turmoil (stable) period.
The following hypothesis is then put to test:
0: 21 =− ρρoH  versus 0: 211 >− ρρH
Where oH  is the null hypothesis of no contagion and 1H  is the alternative hypothesis 
for the presence of contagion
 
4. Empirical Results
4.1 Presentation of results 
Empirical results are presented below in Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table1: International stock indexes returns conditional (unadjusted) correlation coefficient s in 2007 financial crisis
Regions Countries Full period Stable period Short-term turmoil period Medium-term turmoil period Long-term turmoil period 
ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ t-test Co ρ σ t-test Co ρ σ t-test Co
Africa
Botswana -0.040 0.015 0.024 0.014 0.573 0.010 5.641*** Y 0.197 0.008 1.675* Y -0.188 0.013 -2.419** N
Egypt 0.336 0.045 0.196 0.034 0.419 0.028 1.968* Y 0.212 0.028 0.154 N 0.353 0.051 1.757* Y
Kenya 0.083 0.034 0.008 0.028 0.049 0.030 0.494 N -0.178 0.038 -1.656 N 0.079 0.038 0.970 N
Mauritius 0.302 0.030 0.003 0.028 0.001 0.024 0.039 N -0.099 0.027 -0.922 N 0.382 0.031 4.636*** Y
Morocco 0.059 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.022 0.019 -0.014 N -0.109 0.019 -1.288 N 0.051 0.021 0.294 N
Namibia 0.376 0.037 0.417 0.024 0.558 0.034 1.219 N 0.111 0.043 -3.093*** N 0.342 0.045 -0.845 N
Nigeria 0.027 0.038 0.095 0.032 -0.457 0.027 -5.710*** N -0.410 0.026 -5.617*** N -0.060 0.040 -1.743* N
South A 0.435 0.030 0.380 0.021 0.674 0.024 2.641** Y 0.238 0.031 -1.378 N 0.428 0.036 0.522 N
Tunisia 0.258 0.016 0.129 0.014 0.183 0.009 0.462 N 0.165 0.018 0.343 N 0.341 0.018 2.405** Y
Middle 
East
A Dhabi -0.069 0.030 -0.053 0.021 0.246 0.024 2.706*** Y -0.133 0.025 -0.761 N -0.086 0.037 -0.356 N
Bahrain 0.017 0.015 -0.031 0.013 0.477 0.013 5.069*** Y 0.173 0.012 1.998** Y -0.004 0.017 0.297 N
Dubai -0.085 0.039 -0.027 0.027 -0.160 0.031 -1.146 N -0.173 0.030 -1.410 N -0.126 0.048 -1.089 N
Israel 0.264 0.028 0.531 0.023 0.697 0.019 1.444 N 0.287 0.025 -2.411** N 0.089 0.032 -5.462*** N
Jordan 0.015 0.031 0.044 0.020 0.148 0.016 0.893 N 0.034 0.020 -0.105 N 0.011 0.040 -0.381 N
Kuwait -0.085 0.026 n.a n.a 0.681 0.014 n.a 0.106 0.013 n.a -0.085 0.026 n.a
Lebanon 0.200 0.033 0.226 0.023 0.145 0.023 -0.710 N 0.181 0.021 -0.441 N 0.213 0.040 -0.155 N
Oman -0.217 0.031 0.112 0.016 0.013 0.019 -0.865 N -0.261 0.028 -3.867*** N -0.306 0.040 -5.112*** N
Qatar -0.133 0.040 -0.032 0.030 0.186 0.027 1.930* Y -0.101 0.037 -0.653 N -0.175 0.047 -1.595 N
Saudi A 0.012 0.047 0.059 0.041 -0.302 0.027 -3.339*** N -0.113 0.053 -1.681* N -0.002 0.052 0.522 N
Asia
China 0.073 0.056 0.071 0.048 0.528 0.045 4.507*** Y 0.071 0.048 0.064 N 0.063 0.012 -0.582 N
Dhaka 0.047 0.024 -0.275 0.020 -0.462 0.022 -6.698*** N -0.275 0.020 -4.539*** N -0.132 0.020 -3.289*** Y
India 0.264 0.038 0.252 0.044 0.400 0.042 0.574 N 0.252 0.044 -0.778 N 0.212 0.048 -1.355 N
Indonesia 0.057 0.040 0.394 0.054 0.773 0.055 5.268*** Y 0.394 0.054 1.389 N -0.031 0.052 -3.263*** N
Malaysia 0.100 0.026 0.457 0.036 0.838 0.034 6.045*** Y 0.457 0.036 1.903* Y 0.015 0.031 -2.832*** N
Mongolia 0.062 0.046 -0.093 0.044 -0.175 0.056 0.665 N -0.093 0.044 1.538 N 0.049 0.038 3.499*** Y
Pakistan 0.021 0.037 0.330 0.028 0.338 0.033 2.584** Y 0.330 0.028 2.798*** Y -0.031 0.042 -0.898 N
Philippines 0.361 0.040 0.621 0.045 0.855 0.053 7.127*** Y 0.621 0.045 4.229*** Y 0.373 0.048 1.749* Y
S. Korea 0.469 0.034 0.640 0.041 0.822 0.047 10.324*** Y 0.640 0.041 6.945*** Y 0.502 0.042 5.562*** Y
Sri Lanka 0.204 0.027 0.380 0.019 -0.100 0.021 -0.828 N 0.380 0.019 3.997*** Y 0.288 0.027 3.390*** Y
Taiwan 0.429 0.035 0.415 0.040 0.836 0.041 18.401*** Y 0.415 0.040 5.315*** Y 0.482 0.043 7.331*** Y
Thailand 0.355 0.037 0.422 0.039 0.715 0.035 5.908*** Y 0.422 0.039 2.722*** Y 0.385 0.046 2.698*** Y
Vietnam 0.204 0.060 0.319 0.056 0.524 0.032 3.842*** Y 0.319 0.056 1.985* Y 0.195 0.068 0.876 N
 
Latin
America
Argentina 0.543 0.041 0.644 0.026 0.752 0.045 0.934 N 0.630 0.037 -0.136 N 0.505 0.051 -1.556 N
Brazil 0.773 0.043 0.797 0.027 0.831 0.043 0.290 N 0.720 0.042 -0.744 N 0.765 0.052 -0.358 N
Chile 0.690 0.034 0.588 0.020 0.721 0.040 1.154 N 0.710 0.040 1.178 N 0.703 0.043 1.281 N
Columbia 0.475 0.032 0.336 0.026 0.381 0.030 0.386 N 0.616 0.034 2.802*** Y 0.504 0.036 1.896* Y
Costa Rica -0.020 0.028 -0.085 0.031 -0.088 0.019 -0.025 N -0.203 0.023 -1.140 N -0.083 0.021 0.023 N
Ecuador 0.030 0.029 0.085 0.015 0.010 0.005 -0.648 N 0.040 0.049 -0.431 N 0.016 0.037 -0.773 N
Mexico 0.774 0.037 0.721 0.026 0.814 0.037 0.800 N 0.865 0.037 1.391 N 0.784 0.044 0.692 N
Peru 0.422 0.052 -0.066 0.029 0.907 0.063 35.962*** Y 0.693 0.059 11.16*** Y 0.478 0.065 7.185*** Y
Venezuela 0.119 0.034 0.035 0.038 0.193 0.027 1.379 N 0.269 0.034 2.313** Y 0.159 0.030 1.385 N
The table shows the conditional (unadjusted) cross market correlation coefficients (ρ) and standard deviations for the US and other stock markets. Test statistics is obtained from t-
transformations. The stable period is defined as the 14-month pre-crisis period (June 08, 2006 to August 09, 2007). The short-term turmoil period is defined as the four-month crisis 
period (August 09, 2007 to December 06, 2007). The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the eight months crisis period (August 09, 2007 to April 10, 2008). The long-term  
turmoil period is defined the fifteen months crisis period (August 09, 2007 to November 13, 2008). The full period is the stable period plus the long-term turmoil period (June 08, 2006  
to November 13, 2008). Contagion (Co) occurs (Y)when the test statistics is greater than the critical values. No contagion (N) occurs when the test statistics is less than or equal to the  
critical value.*, **, ***: represent  significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. (nt+ns-4) degrees of freedom for the t-statistics are (66+61-4); (35+61-4);(17+61-4) for the long,  
medium and short terms respectively. σ: represents the standard deviation. 
Table 2: International stock indexes returns unconditional (adjusted) correlation coefficient   in 2007 financial crisis
Regions Countries Full period Stable period Short-term turmoil period Medium-term turmoil period Long-term turmoil period 
ρ σ ρ*stp ρ*mtp ρ*ltp ρ* δ t-test Co ρ* δ t-test Co ρ* δ t-test Co
Africa
Botswana -0.040 0.015 0.030 0.034 0.026 0.647 -0.321 6.747*** Y 0.265 -0.466 2.278** Y -0.197 -0.090 -2.538** N
Egypt 0.336 0.045 0.219 0.217 0.163 0.459 -0.202 2.133** Y 0.234 -0.189 0.168 N 0.296 0.475 1.498 N
Kenya 0.083 0.034 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 0.048 0.062 0.479 N -0.155 0.339 -1.432 N 0.069 0.317 0.845 N
Mauritius 0.302 0.030 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.163 0.043 N -0.102 -0.057 -0.949 N 0.373 0.060 4.502*** Y
Morocco 0.059 0.024 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.026 -0.250 -0.016 N -0.126 -0.250 -1.489 N 0.055 -0.160 0.320 N
Namibia 0.376 0.037 0.366 0.329 0.323 0.499 0.362 1.152 N 0.084 0.745 -2.419** N 0.261 0.809 -0.694 N
Nigeria 0.027 0.038 0.105 0.106 0.086 -0.492 -0.171 -6.40*** N -0.448 -0.195 -6.38*** N -0.054 0.225 -1.573 N
South A 0.435 0.030 0.358 0.321 0.302 0.648 0.151 2.604** Y 0.198 0.471 -1.188 N 0.342 0.688 0.446 N
Tunisia 0.258 0.016 0.166 0.117 0.117 0.233 -0.399 0.582 N 0.150 0.221 0.312 N 0.311 0.228 2.198** Y
Middle
East
A Dhabi -0.069 0.030 -0.051 -0.050 -0.041 0.235 0.107 2.566** Y -0.124 0.145 -0.713 N -0.066 0.686 -0.275 N
Bahrain 0.017 0.015 -0.032 -0.033 -0.028 0.483 -0.033 5.160*** Y 0.181 -0.089 2.095** Y -0.004 0.235 0.268 N
Dubai -0.085 0.039 -0.027 -0.166 -0.021 -0.152 0.110 -1.089 N -0.166 0.094 -0.002 N -0.096 0.727 -0.830 N
Israel 0.264 0.028 0.569 0.522 0.477 0.731 -0.180 1.414 N 0.281 0.052 -2.380** N 0.077 0.338 -4.829 Y
Jordan 0.015 0.031 0.050 0.045 0.032 0.166 -0.204 0.998 N 0.034 -0.017 -0.106 N 0.007 1.009 -0.269 N
Kuwait -0.085 0.026 n.a -0.007 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Lebanon 0.200 0.033 0.233 0.239 0.178 0.148 -0.051 -0.727 N 0.191 -0.106 -0.463 N 0.167 0.653 -0.124 N
Oman -0.217 0.031 0.104 0.087 0.072 0.012 0.181 -0.796 N -0.204 0.680 -2.92*** N -0.201 1.453 -3.14*** N
Qatar -0.133 0.040 -0.035 -0.030 -0.026 0.198 -0.123 2.063** Y -0.092 0.196 -0.598 N -0.142 0.540 -1.289 N
Saudi A 0.012 0.047 0.074 0.052 0.053 -0.366 -0.351 -4.21*** N -0.099 0.294 -1.474 N -0.002 0.267 -0.606 N
Asia
China 0.073 0.056 0.058 0.059 0.052 0.488 0.112 4.108*** Y 0.065 0.165 0.060 N 0.009 0.533 -0.470 N
Dhaka 0.047 0.024 0.178 0.173 0.171 -0.510 -0.121 -8.05*** N -0.309 -0.224 -5.27*** N -0.148 -0.210 -3.732 Y
India 0.264 0.038 0.223 0.266 0.256 0.272 0.559 0.426 N 0.200 0.637 -0.639 N 0.161 0.773 -1.067 N
Indonesia 0.057 0.040 0.107 0.165 0.169 0.490 1.441 3.566*** Y 0.267 1.392 0.983 N -0.021 1.287 -2.142** N
Malaysia 0.100 0.026 0.152 0.195 0.208 0.679 0.780 5.338*** Y 0.352 0.872 1.521 N 0.012 0.632 2.222** Y
Mongolia 0.062 0.046 -0.203 -0.253 -0.270 -0.140 0.258 0.543 N -0.094 -0.009 1.544 N 0.053 -0.138 3.782*** Y
Pakistan 0.021 0.037 0.047 0.052 0.043 0.318 0.072 2.420** Y 0.342 -0.077 2.906*** Y -0.026 0.382 -0.764 N
Philippines 0.361 0.040 0.122 0.176 0.171 0.701 0.817 6.113*** Y 0.537 0.545 3.712*** Y 0.299 0.650 1.432 N
S. Korea 0.469 0.034 0.020 0.035 0.034 0.527 1.724 5.060*** Y 0.477 1.348 4.734*** Y 0.350 1.410 3.687*** Y
Sri Lanka 0.204 0.027 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.127 -0.216 -1.056 N 0.434 -0.271 4.687*** Y 0.286 0.017 3.362*** Y
Taiwan 0.429 0.035 -0.034 -0.050 -0.048 0.639 1.028 7.839*** Y 0.311 0.945 3.711*** Y 0.355 1.105 4.876*** Y
Thailand 0.355 0.037 0.109 0.121 0.111 0.605 0.374 4.908*** Y 0.353 0.527 2.282** Y 0.296 0.815 2.087** Y
Vietnam 0.204 0.060 0.172 0.109 0.098 0.687 -0.327 5.169*** Y 0.299 0.155 1.862* Y 0.165 0.416 0.744 N
Latin 
America
Argentina 0.543 0.041 0.538 0.579 0.410 0.654 0.746 1.006 N 0.565 0.407 -0.139 N 0.293 0.976 -1.312 N
Brazil 0.773 0.043 0.724 0.728 0.601 0.765 0.586 0.352 N 0.640 0.550 -0.843 N 0.557 0.900 -0.482 N
Chile 0.690 0.034 0.453 0.454 0.326 0.589 1.044 1.174 N 0.577 1.035 1.189 N 0.434 1.228 1.198 N
Columbia 0.475 0.032 0.316 0.300 0.252 0.359 0.142 0.370 N 0.567 0.289 2.665*** Y 0.394 0.377 1.591 N
Costa Rica -0.020 0.028 -0.108 -0.097 -0.123 -0.111 -0.376 -0.031 N -0.231 -0.235 -1.294 N -0.120 -0.309 0.033 N
Ecuador 0.030 0.029 0.145 0.047 0.034 0.017 -0.659 -1.106 N 0.022 2.360 -0.236 N 0.006 1.517 -0.308 N
Mexico 0.774 0.037 0.657 0.655 0.537 0.761 0.430 0.898 N 0.820 0.442 1.607 N 0.614 0.715 0.857 N
Peru 0.422 0.052 -0.045 -0.046 -0.029 0.824 1.184 15.092*** Y 0.555 1.072 7.210*** Y 0.242 1.268 3.117*** Y
Venezuela 0.119 0.034 0.042 0.037 0.044 0.229 -0.301 1.642 N 0.285 -0.114 2.452** Y 0.201 -0.216 1.760* Y
The table shows the unconditional (adjusted) cross market correlation coefficients (ρ) and standard deviations for the US and other stock markets. Test statistics is obtained from t-
transformations. The stable period is defined as the 14-month pre-crisis period (June 08, 2006 to August 09, 2007). The short-term turmoil period is defined as the four-month crisis 
period (August 09, 2007 to December 06, 2007). The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the eight months crisis period (August 09, 2007 to April 10, 2008). The long-term  
turmoil period is defined the fifteen months crisis period (August 09, 2007 to November 13, 2008). The full period is the stable period plus the long-term turmoil period (June 08, 2006  
to November 13, 2008). Contagion (Co) occurs (Y) when the test statistics is greater than the critical values. No contagion (N) occurs when the test statistics is less than or equal to  
the critical value.*, **, ***: represent  significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. (nt+ns-4) degrees of freedom for the t-statistics are (66+61-4); (35+61-4);(17+61-4) for the long,  
medium and short terms respectively. σ: represents  the standard deviation. ρ*stp, ρ*mtp, ρ*ltp denote adjusted correlation coefficients for the short, medium and long term periods 
respectively. δ: correlation coefficient adjuster. 
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4.2 Discussion of results
As shown in Tables 1 and 2,  contagion results based on significant  shifts in 
conditional  (unadjusted) correlation coefficients  are robust  to adjusted (unconditional) 
correlations. From a broad point of view the following effects of the financial crisis could 
be observed: (1) with the exceptions of India and Dhaka,  Asian markets were worst hit; 
(2) but for Peru, Venezuela and Columbia, Latin American countries were least affected; 
(3)  Africa  and Middle  East  emerging markets were averagely  contaminated with  the 
exceptions of Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria,  Morocco, Dubai, Jordan, Israel, Oman, Saudi 
Arabia and Lebanon. 
The somewhat immunity of Latin American countries to the recent global financial 
meltdown is not unexpected. Given its history of financial crises, this continent was the 
most  prepared.  Current  conditions  show that  Latin  America  has improved since  the 
Russian  crisis,  which  gave  countries  in  the  continent  some  leeway  (particularly  in 
monetary policy) to implement measures that attenuate crisis effect. Latin America and 
the Caribbean countries have built up to 400 billion dollars in international reserves and 
they  have  substantially  reduced  their  dollar-denominated  debt,  especially  within  the 
banking system. For instance, lower levels of debt dollarization has allowed Brazil  to 
loosen monetary policy amid the credit crunch in ways that many countries could not in 
the post Russian crisis era. In the wake of the financial crisis, Latin American countries 
swiftly  depreciated  their  currencies  without  entering  the  turmoil.   From  a  fiscal 
perspective, many of these countries saved a considerable amount of their tax income 
on extra revenue from commodity bonanza at the turn of the century. For instance, Chile 
spent only 34% and kept the rest of increased tax collected in a special fund. Therefore 
even if the crisis had affected these countries, they still had the leeway of increasing 
spending while lowering taxes, so as to easily recover from recession.  
Results from Africa are entirely not unexpected. But for Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria 
and Morocco, African stock markets are contaminated in at least one time horizon. This 
reflects  the  increasing  connection  of  African  markets  with  global  capital  flows.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  African  markets  are  growing  in  size,  liquidity  and  degree  of  foreign 
participation. Though it may be misleading to equate contagion to integration, a logical 
extension of results could make a case for African equity markets global integration.
Looking  at  the  Middle  East,  with  the  exceptions  of  Israel,  Oman  and  Saudi 
Arabia,   oil  exporting countries (Bahrain and Qatar)  were contaminated while  but for 
Abu  Dhabi  non  producing  states  (Dubai,  Jordan,  Lebanon)   remained  unaffected. 
Borrowing from Anoruo and Mustafa (2007) on the relation between oil and stock prices, 
where causality runs from the Dow Jones Industrial Average(DJIA) to oil prices and not 
vice versa; the DJIA which is our base criterion in this study negatively affected oil prices 
which in-turn had a toll on stock markets of oil exporting countries. 
While Dhaka and India in Asia remained uncontaminated, China and Mongolia 
were affected only in the short and long horizons respectively. Other emerging markets 
were contaminated at least in two time-horizons each. The unexpected speed and force 
with which the global financial crisis affected Asian economies could be explained from 
trade channels. The region has deep economic integration with the rest of the world, 
especially  developments  in  the  United  States.  A case  in  point  is  the  loss  in  export 
volume growth in Western Asia from 6.4% in 2006 to -0.6 in 2007.  Conversely, the fact 
that India was unaffected is not unexpected. This is because, India has a completely 
different approach to financial globalization. Whereas, the Indian current account was 
fully  opened  on  a  gradual  basis  in  the  90s,  a  more  calibrated  approach  has  been 
followed to the opening of the capital account and subsequently the financial sector. This 
approach is consistent with the weight of available empirical evidence on the benefits of 
capital  account  liberalization  for  acceleration  of  economic  growth,  particularly  in 
emerging  economies.  Evidence  suggests  that  the  greatest  gains  are  obtained  from 
openness to foreign direct investment followed by portfolio investment. Benefits resulting 
from  external  debt  flows  are  questionable  until  greater  domestic  financial  market 
development has taken place (Henry, 2007).
5. Conclusion 
Financial  integration among economies has the benefit of improving allocation 
efficiency and diversifying risk. However the recent global financial crisis, considered as 
the worst since the Great Depression has re-ignited the fierce debate about the merits of 
financial globalization and its implications for growth especially in developing countries. 
This paper has examined whether equity markets in emerging countries were vulnerable 
to contagion during the recent global financial meltdown. Findings  show: (1) with the 
exceptions  of  India  and  Dhaka,   Asian  markets  were  worst  hit;  (2)  but  for  Peru, 
Venezuela and Columbia, Latin American countries were least affected; (3) Africa and 
Middle  East  emerging  markets  were  averagely  contaminated  with  the  exceptions  of 
Kenya,  Namibia,  Nigeria,  Morocco,  Dubai,  Jordan,  Israel,  Oman,  Saudi  Arabia  and 
Lebanon. 
Results  have  two  important  policy  implications.  Firstly,  we  confirm  that  Latin 
America  was  most  prepared  to  brace  the  financial  crisis,  implying  their  fiscal  and 
monetary  policies  are  desirous  of  examination  and  imitation.  Secondly,  we  have 
confirmed that strategic opening of the current and capital accounts based on empirical 
evidence for a given region/country as practiced by India is a caution against  global 
economic and financial shocks.   
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